
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit



APPENDIX

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

Docket No. 74-2070



UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Appellee,

-against-

BOBBY TARVER.

Defendant-Appellant



On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York

BRIEF AND APPENDIX ON BEHALF OF APPELLANT TARVER

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

	PAGE
STATEMENT OF CASE	3
POINT ONE	
It Was Error For the Court To Allow Testimony Regarding The Appellant's In Other Crimes	4
CONCLUSION	5

TABLE OF CASES CITED

	PAGE
Spencer v. State of Texas 385 U,S, 561, 87 S. Ct. 652	5
Kilarjian v. Horvath, 379 F. 2d 547 (2 Cir. 1967)	5

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Appellee,

-against-

INDICTMENT NO.

74CR-177

BOBBY TARVER.

Defendant-Appellant

STATEMENT OF CASE

Appellant, BOBBY TARVER, was named in a four count indictment, together with co-defendant, HARVEY BONNER.

Under Indictment 74-CR-177, both defendants were charged with two counts of Possession and intent to distribute heroin on October 25, 1973 and November 7, 1973. The other two counts charge both defendants with actual distribution of the heroin on the above dates.

On the trial of the indictment, the appellant was represented by Joel Winograd. The trial was before the Honorable Jack B. Weinstein and a Jury and lasted two days. The Jury returned a verdict of guilty on all counts against both defendants. Appellant, BOBBY TARVER, was sentenced to the care and custody of the Attorney General for a term of five (5) years, plus a period of special parole.

The appellant was allowed to remain free on bail, pending appeal.

POINT ONE

TO ALLOW TESTIMONY REGARDING THE APPELLANTS INVOLVEMENT IN OTHER CRIMES.

Detective Feurtado, the undercover police officer in this case testified on direct examination that the co-defendant, HARVEY BONNER, had told him that the appellant had forgotten the package because he had been snorting cocaine (61; A-1). An objection was immediately made by appellant's attorney. After a sidebar discussion, Judge Weinstein ruled that the statement was made in the course of the conspiracy and was in furtherance and was used to explain why the delivery wasn't made. (62; A-2).

Neither the appellant nor his co-defendant were charged in the instant Indictment with the crime of conspiracy.

During the course of the same sidebar discussion, Judge Weinstein ruled that in the exercise of his discretion the probative force of this statement is greater than the prejudicial value (65; A-5).

The effect of allowing this statement to remain before the jury was to show criminal propensity on the part of the appellant.

The Trial Judge is required, as with any potentially prejudical evidence, to balance all of the relevant factors to determine whether the prohibitive value of the evidence of other crimes is outweighed by its prejudical character.

Spencer v. State of Texas, 385, U.D. 561, 87 S. Ct. 652;

Kilarjian v. Horvath, 379 F. 2d 547 (2 Cir. 1967).

What was presented to the jury was certainly prejudicial and was not relevant or material to the jury's deliberation.

The net effect was that the jury was allowed to infer that since appellant has snorted cocaine, he certainly possessed it and if he possessed the cocaine, he most likely sold it.

The jury was permitted to infer the above from the highly prejudicial statement made by co-defendant, HARVEY BONNER to Detective Feurtado.

CONCLUSION

THE JUDGMENT BELOW SHOULD BE REVERSED AND A NEW

TRIAL OF DERED.

AURITANO, SCHŁACTE WINOGRAD

Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant

JOEL WINOGRAD, ESQ.

AND CONTENT

A P P E N D I X

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"He has the package?" Yes. . (

Did you go with "tr. Marver at that time? 6

At that time I followed Dr. Tarver into the bar area. I was accompanied by the confidential informant. Once we were inside the bay area, Mr. Tarver stopped, turned, and walked back out to the garage area, where he had a conversation with Mr. Bonner, at which time I turned around with the informant and we stayed -- went back outside to the gas station area.

Did there come a time when Mr. Tarver returned 0 to the gas station?

Yes.

Would you tell us the circumstances surrounding his return?

Mr. Bonner had approached me and told me that Mr. Tarver had been snorting cocaine --

> MR. WINOGRAD: Objection, your Ponor, and I move for a mistrial.

Your Honor, may we approach the bench with the prosecutor?

THE COURT: Yes.

(A discussion was held at sidebar.)

TR. VI.00 CD: Your Honor, after we had our

hearing before, Mr. Bashian and Mr. Corcoran presented to me another problem that they had, insofar as there was another statement made by Mr. Bonner with respect to Mr. Tarver in that the statement made to the undercover — that Mr. Tarver had forgotten the package because he had been snorting cocains carli

Now he said that -- I said it was a problem that you couldn't use it. He said he would take it up with you before using it. I told him to speak to the officer.

THE COURT: Well, why can't he use it?

MR. WINOGRAD: I think it's a problem that implicates my client and shows criminal activity on his part.

of the conspiracy, it explains the actions of the parties and is in furtherance of the conspiracy to explain why the delivery wasn't made forthwith.

MR. WINOGRAD: But, Judge, this didn't only come from my client. It came from Mr. Donner. Bonner allegedly.

THE COURT: Bonner is not an undercover agent.

MR. WINOGRAD: I understand.

THE COURT: Ha's a co-conspirator. I find beyond

a reasonable doubt there was a co-conspirator, this was in the course of the conspiracy and in furtherance of it. It's not like a post-arrest statement such as we were dealing with in the suppression hearing.

MR. WINOGRAD: All right.

THE COURT: It's a simple evidentiary point.

MR. WINOGRAD: All right. My objection is noted, your Honor.

THE COURT: The objection is on what ground, hearsay?

MR. WINOGRAD: Well, it can't be hearsay because you have declared them to be co-conspirators.

THE COURT: What's the objection?

MR. WINOGRAD: The objection is, I think it is together with the other situation, the statements that were made with respect to the co-defendint.

In other words, Bonner -- with respect to the statement made before which you excluded. At that time I said to you, well, will you exclude this, you said you are going to bring it up with the Judge.

THE COURT: I don't understand the objection.
I'm sorry.

MR. WINDGRAD: The objection is as follows:

It's a statement that was made by Bonner to the undercover agent indicating the actions of the defendant

Feurtado-Direct

Tarvar, why he forgot the package. It was my position that this was a statement made that should be excluded.

THE COURT: On what ground?

mm. MINOGRAD: On the grounds -- the same grounds that he excluded the other, that there is a bruton problem here, What if he doesn't take the stend, what if I don't cross --

This is an entirely different problem. That's a post-conspiracy statement.

Mr. WINOGRAD: I understand that this was during the conspiracy, but I still object.

THE COURT: On the hearsay grounds?

MR. WINOSTAD: On hearsay.

THE COURT: Overruled on that ground.

MR. CUTLER: One other thought, Judge, --

IN. CORCORAL: Are you objecting, Mr. Cutler?

they are declared co-conspirators, I would object on the grounds that it's introducing an accusation of another crime into the trial, the crime of cocaine-snorting, it's possession.

THE COURT: There is no such crime.

MR. CUTLER: Well, possession of cocaine is a crime.

THE COURT: If you wish an instruction to the

jury I will give it to them. Do you wish an instruction.

ICR. CUTLUR: Really, I can't -- no, I don't

THE COURT: Well, they -- then I can't give it if you don't want it. It clearly explains what was happeing there.

Proceed. Come back, gentlemen.

(Return to sidebar.)

want to bring it to their attention.

I assume that had counsel thought of it, they would have made it on the ground that the prejudice was greater than the probative force. I rule as a matter of the enercise of my discretion that the probative force of this is greater than the prejudicial value and it is necessary for the jury to understand what was going on among these parties.

Otherwise it would be entirely confusing to them, and they would lose the entire force of the testimony.

MR. CUTLER: Judge, can I get in one thought,
your Monor, on this objection: Is that -- we are
only at the very inception of the policeman's testimony
it's only about his 7th or 8th statement that he has
testified to, and this introduces --